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ABSTRACT
De literatuur over falingspredictie negeert eigendomsstructuren en maakt de assump-
tie dat alle ondernemingen onafhankelijke economische entiteiten zijn. Door het
belang van ondernemingsgroepen gaat die assumptie niet op voor het Europese
Continent. In een steekproef bestaande uit middelgrote en grote Belgische onder-
nemingen tonen we aan dat de verklarende kracht van een aantal vaakgebruikte
boekhoudkundige ratio’s (vb. winstgevendheid, schuldgraad, liquiditeit en efficiën-
tie) verschillend is voor ondernemingen die deel uitmaken van een groep dan wel
voor zelfstandige bedrijven. Het uitspelen van de relatieve verschillen in verkla-
ringskracht kan de performantie van een falingspredictiemodel verbeteren zonder
nieuwe informatie toe te voegen. Verdere verbetering is nog mogelijk door rechtst-
reeks te corrigeren voor groepsgebonden effecten, bijvoorbeeld door het toevoegen
van een maatstaf voor de financiële situatie van de hele groep. Tenslotte wordt aan-
getoond dat ook de voorspellingskracht van enkele vooraanstaande predictiemo-
dellen kan verbeterd worden door rekening te houden met groepsfactoren.
* * *
The bankruptcy prediction literature generally ignores corporate ownership and
assumes companies are independent economic entities. In Continental Europe this
latter assumption does not hold, due to the importance of business groups. Using a
sample of mostly non-quoted Belgian medium and large sized companies, we show
that the predictive power of several accounting ratios that are commonly used in
bankruptcy prediction models (e.g. performance, leverage, liquidity and efficiency)
is different for group member companies as compared to stand-alone companies. By
exploiting these differences in relative importance, model fit can be improved with-
out adding any new information. Performance can be increased further by directly
adjusting for group related factors, e.g. by including a measure of financial health
of the group as a whole. Finally, it is shown that group adjustments can also improve
the fit of some well-known existing prediction models.
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Ever since the late 1960s, publicly available financial statement data
has been actively examined to predict corporate failure. This is hardly
surprising given the importance of the topic to many different eco-
nomic agents: financial institutions and suppliers need to be able to
form an opinion on the credit worthiness of a client; institutional
investors want to identify acceptable investment risks; auditors are
interested in the going concern probabilities of a company; govern-
ment agencies need a reliable identification tool to grant support to dis-
tressed companies, etc. Knowledge of the financial health of a com-
pany can benefit individual stakeholders (e.g. clients, employees and
managers) as well.
A. No miracles in the bankruptcy prediction literature
All bankruptcy prediction models in the literature are build on the
basic insights of a small number of pioneering papers: Beaver (1966)
who introduces univariate tests on financial ratios, Altman (1968) who
is the first to use Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in clas-
sifying failing versus non-failing companies and Ohlson (1980) who
points to statistical problems with respect to MDA and prefers logis-
tic regression as discriminating method.
During the last decades researchers have made continuous efforts to
increase predictive performance. Most models select explanatory vari-
ables from a large pool of financial ratios, based either on stepwise
selection methods or past performance in the literature. Some other
studies argue there are theoretical grounds on which to build distress
models, for instance cash flow identities (Aziz et al. (1988)) or vari-
ations in market returns (Aharony et al. (1980)). Other attempts to
improve modeling include refining the definition of distress and incor-
porating additional information. For example, Lau (1987) distinguishes
five different states of distress and uses multinomial logit models and
Kluger and Shields (1989) find that changes in information quality
due to auditor changes can be helpful in improving predictive perfor-
mance. In addition, a growing number of niche models are being
developed; Huyghebaert et al. (2000), for instance, use a cash flow
based model to predict survival of start-up companies. Mossman et al.
(1998) compare four different approaches using a single data set and
conclude that ratio models do best for short-term prediction (one year
624before failure) and cash flow models perform adequately as an early
warning signal (three years before failure).
Many of the more recent studies on bankruptcy prediction examine
the usefulness of more sophisticated estimation techniques. Altman et
al. (1994) evaluate the performance of classic (MDA and logit) mod-
els versus that of neural networks of varying complexity. They find
neural networks are not superior, even when compared to a simple
MDA approach. Other methodological issues are raised by e.g. Laiti-
nen and Laitinen (2000), who explore the usefulness of Taylor series
expansions in logistic regressions and Shumway (2001), who builds
a case for forecasting bankruptcy using hazard models instead of sta-
tic techniques.
While the majority of models that received most attention in the lit-
erature focused on quoted companies in the United States, many
researchers have developed models for quoted and/or private compa-
nies in their home countries. Asurvey of these efforts – both in indus-
trialized and in developing countries – is contained in Altman and
Narayanan (1997). The survey shows there is no real consensus on
which technique best estimates the probability of corporate failure.
However, there is much similarity in the selected predictors: measures
of past and present performance, liquidity, solvability, efficiency and
– depending on the sampling approach – size and industry.
B. Business group effects: little studied but potentially important
All of the bankruptcy prediction models discussed above ignore cor-
porate ownership structure. In essence, this is equivalent to making
the assumption that all companies are stand-alone, i.e. independent
economic entities. However, during the 1990s empirical studies have
shown that the classic Bearle and Means (1932) assumption of dis-
persed ownership is mostly relevant for publicly quoted firms in
Anglo-Saxon countries. La Porta et al. (1999), for instance, find that
ultimate ownership and control in Continental Europe often belongs
to families, financial groups or, in some cases, the State. This con-
trol is achieved through pyramidal holding structures, cross-holding
constructions and – in countries where this is legal – shares with dif-
ferential voting rights. Of the 27 industrialized countries examined
in La Porta et al. (1999), Belgium has the highest score for the pres-
ence of pyramids and controlling shareholders. Becht et al. (1999)
confirm that, due to concentrated corporate ownership by holding
625companies and families, Belgium is a prototype of an ‘insider sys-
tem’.
Links between companies create agency problems that are not as
straightforward as those discussed in the literature of the 1970s and
1980s (Bebchuk et al. (2000)). Moreover, the existence of business
groups gives rise to the formation of internal capital markets. These
enable groups and conglomerates to actively shift resources and risk
throughout their structure. Deloof (1998) empirically confirms the
importance of intra-group financing for Belgian non-quoted compa-
nies.
If a company has access to an internal capital market popular bank-
ruptcy prediction ratios likely are biased. For instance, empirical
research has documented that group member companies have lower
liquidity constraints and hence maintain lower liquidity levels (Hoshi
et al. (1991); Deloof (2001)) than their stand-alone counterparts. The
power of liquidity ratios to predict bankruptcy of the former firms
may therefore be limited. The information content of leverage ratios
may be affected by internal capital markets as well: group member-
ship may increase debt bearing capacity (Hoshi et al. (1990)) while the
leverage of individual firms within the group likely is the result of a
global cost minimizing intra-group optimisation process (cf. Faccio
et al. (2001); Bianco and Nicodano (2002)). Even performance mea-
sures – usually the strongest class of predictors – may not have the
same predictive ability as they have in the case of stand-alone com-
panies: several studies have shown that groups or conglomerates tend
to systematically support weakly performing subsidiaries (Lamont
(1997); Claessens et al. (2002)). This type of behavior may be inspired
by strategic, taxation or control considerations, but could also be due
to inefficiencies sometimes referred to as ‘socialism within the group’
(Sharfstein et al. (1998)). Furthermore, bankrupting a subsidiary may
have a severe negative impact on the relationships between the par-
ent and its lenders and on the group’s reputation in general, leading
to a group-wide increase in the cost of capital (Bebchuk et al. (2000)).
A limited number of models have attempted to correct for group
effects. A straightforward way of doing this is by including a dummy
variable representing group membership. Using this approach on a set
of Italian SMEs, Bechetti and Sierra (2003) find that, ceteris paribus,
group member firms have a lower probability of failure than stand-
alone companies. Heiss and Köke (2001) examine the impact of con-
trol structure on ownership changes and failure in Germany. They
626introduce a Herfindahl index for ownership concentration and dum-
mies for the existence of an ultimate owner, pyramid membership and
level within the group. Although they report a significant relationship
between ownership concentration and occurrence of a control change,
they find no evidence of a link between ownership and failure. How-
ever, they indicate that this may be a result of lack of power due to
the very low number of failing firms in their sample. Finally, in a
three-years-before-bankruptcy prediction model developed for Bel-
gian non-quoted small, medium and large companies, Ooghe et al.
(1991) introduce a ‘group relationship’ ratio. This ratio reflects the
importance of the commitments (amounts receivable, secured loans,
etc.) taken up by a firm to the benefit of affiliated companies.
Using a sample of mostly non-quoted Belgian medium and large
sized companies, our paper attempts to further improve bankruptcy
prediction model performance by controlling for group membership in
a more refined way. First, we estimate separate models for group
member and stand-alone companies. This should allow us to examine
whether or not the importance of specific prediction ratios differs
across different company types. Second, we refine the group rela-
tionship ratio of Ooghe et al. (1991) by also taking into account com-
mitments made by affiliated companies in favor of the sample com-
pany. Next, whatever the underlying motivation, the extent to which
weak subsidiaries can be supported is likely to be related to the finan-
cial situation of the group as a whole. We therefore include a measure
of the group’s financial health (Altman Z” score) as a predictor of the
bankruptcy probability of its subsidiaries. Finally, we analyze whether
including group control variables increases the performance of some
well-known international (Altman (1983)) and Belgian (Ooghe et al.
(1991)) prediction models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II dis-
cusses the sample composition and some methodological issues; section
III describes the tests and empirical findings and section IV concludes.
II. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data and sample construction
We start from the set containing all non-financial Belgian limited lia-
bility corporations (NV/SA) filing complete financial accounts for at
627least one year between fiscal years 1996 and 2001. As only compa-
nies that meet certain size criteria are obliged to do this, the data set
consists of medium sized and large firms.1Accounting data and infor-
mation on ownership and legal status have been obtained from
BelFirst (Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing) and the National
Bank of Belgium (NBB). In this set, 252 companies are identified as
filing for bankruptcy (cf. U.S. Chapter 7) or judicial composition
(cf. U.S. Chapter 11) between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st,
2002.
Following the literature, we estimate both short-term (one year
before failure) and medium term models (three years before failure).
To avoid an artificial increase in predictive performance the use of
information published after the bankruptcy filing is minimized. As the
average publication lag for Belgian companies is 7 months, year t-1
is defined as the fiscal year ended between 7 and 19 months prior to
failure. Year t-3 is set as two fiscal years before t-1. To be able to
compare across different prediction lengths, we only include firms
with information for both years t-1 and t-3. This implies a loss of
71 data points. Furthermore, 25 observations are lost due to missing
data and three more companies were deleted due to company specific
reasons.2 The remaining 153 bankrupt companies are randomly paired
with an equal number of non-failing firms with data from the same fis-
cal years (cf. Ohlson (1980)).
Next, the ownership structure of the sample companies is exam-
ined. It is assumed that corporations that directly or indirectly hold
more than 50% of another company’s shares, have full control over
financing decisions. These controlling shareholders are termed cor-
porate owners (CO). If the CO itself is fully controlled (+50%) by
another company, this third corporation controls the sample firm as
well. We continue to follow this decision rule until the ultimate cor-
porate owner (UCO) is identified. This UCO is thus assumed to con-
trol the business group to which it belongs. Setting a lower control
threshold (e.g. 20 or 30%) would only have a marginal impact in our
setting with highly concentrated ownership.3 Consolidated statements
are used when available, as these should give the most realistic view
of the group’s financial situation (62.4% of UCOs at t-1 and 52.3% at
t-3). If not, UCO level information is used as proxy for group char-
acteristics. Data on the UCO is obtained from the databases mentioned
above and from Datastream or Amadeus for international owners. For
a number of UCOs (23 at t-1 and 20 at t-3) the sample firm is its only
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a taxation or limited liability construction instead of the hub of a busi-
ness group. Therefore their subsidiaries are reclassified as stand-alone
firms.
The detailed sample composition is given in Table 1. The 153 failed
and 153 non failed firms are split into two sub-samples: stand-alone
and group member companies. The importance of business groups in
the Belgian economy is confirmed by the large number of group mem-
ber companies in the sample (more than 46% at t-1). Note that due to
some ownership changes, a small number of companies shifted across
sub-samples between t-3 and t-1.
Based on the discussion in section I, we compute standard bank-
ruptcy prediction ratios: liquidity (LIQ; quick ratio), past performance
(PP; retained earnings), current performance (ROA; return on assets),
leverage (LEV; total debt) and efficiency (EFF; asset turnover). More
precise definitions and the expected relationship of the variables to
the probability of bankruptcy are given in Table 2. The proxy for sales
generating efficiency (EFF) is known to be industry sensitive (for
instance, the asset turnovers of a retailer and of a metallurgy company
are completely different). Therefore, EFF is industry-adjusted by sub-
tracting the industry median ratio first and then dividing by the indus-
try inter-quartile range (cf. Cudd and Duggal (2000)).4
A second group of variables defined in Table 2 are meant to con-





Total #  % # % ‘00 ‘01 ‘02
obs.
t-1 Stand Alone Companies 165 53.9 96 58.1 34 34 28
Group Member Companies 141 46.1 57 40.4 15 17 25
Full Sample 306 153 49 51 53
t-3 Stand Alone Companies 176 57.5 96 54.5 34 35 27
Group Member Companies 130 42.5 57 43.8 15 16 26
Full Sample 306 153 49 51 53these include a dummy for group membership (GROUP), a measure
for the net commitments (receivables, guarantees, etc.) the sample
company has received from affiliated companies5 (NCOM) and a mea-
sure of the financial health of the group or UCO (GZ). This last vari-
able is the Z” score calculated at the UCO level using the original
Altman (1983) coefficients. The very low data requirements enable
us to compute a Z” score for both the Belgian and the international
owners in our sample.
To reduce the influence of extreme observations, all continuous
explanatory variables are winsorized at 5 and 95%.
B. Methodological issues
Despite the development of more advanced classification techniques,
Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and logistic regression
(LR) continue to be the most widely used techniques (Altman and
Narayanan (1997)). LR has the advantage that it imposes no assump-
tions on the distribution of the predictors or the prior probabilities of
bankruptcy. It also provides better scope to perform standard signifi-
cance tests. In addition, for reasons of comparability and following
Mossman et al. (1998), all models in this paper are estimated using
logistic regression, even if originally they have been developed with
MDA (e.g. the Altman (1983) model).
In a binomial logistic setting, the (adjusted) R2 cannot be used for
evaluating model performance. In this paper, the squared Pearson cor-
relation coefficient functions as a simple R2 equivalent. For r2
expresses in a straightforward way the closeness of the model’s pre-
dictions to the observed values (Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)). An
alternative performance measure is the number of correct classifica-
tions. We report the percentage of classification success for the esti-
mated model both in sample and quasi-jack-knife corrected.6 How-
ever, classification success is a very crude approximation to
bankruptcy prediction, as, by definition, for any company it can only
take on a value of either 1 or 0. In practice, companies are subject to
different degrees of bankruptcy risk so that a continuous variable is
more appropriate.In credit scoring, for instance, model output (i.e. the
actual predicted value, not a 0/1 prediction) is translated into internal
risk categories or transformed into bond equivalent ratings (Altman







Variable Definition Proxy for E(Failure Prob.)
Basic Prediction Ratios
LIQ (current asstes – inventory and W.I.P.)∞ ⁄∞(current liabilities) Liquidity –
PP (reserves + retained earnings)∞ ⁄∞(total assets) Past Performance –
ROA (operating profits (losses))∞ ⁄∞(total assets) Current Performance –
LEV (ST debt + LT debt)∞ ⁄∞(total assets) Leverage +
EFF Industry-adjusted (sales∞ ⁄∞total assets) Efficiency –
Group Adjustments
GROUP dummy variable: 1 if an Ultimate Corporate Owner is identified  Group Membership –
NCOM Net Commitments from 
Affiliated Companies
–
GZ Altman Z” score of Ultimate Corporate Owner§ Group Financial Health –
§Z’’ = 6.56 AX1 + 3.26 AX2 + 6.72 AX3 + 1.05 AX4(see Appendix for definitions of Altman (1983) variables)
commitments made by affiliated companies






  ()III. TESTS AND RESULTS
A. Summary statistics and univariate tests
The one and three years before failure median values of all continu-
ous standard predictors and group adjustment variables are shown in
Table 3. Statistics are given for the full sample and for the stand-alone
and group member sub-samples separately. Wilcoxon tests for equal-
ity of medians between failing and non-failing companies are reported
in brackets.
As could be expected, median liquidity (LIQ), performance (PP
and ROA), leverage (LEV) and sales generating efficiency (EFF) are
considerably worse for failing firms as compared to non-failing com-
panies. Univariate tests strongly reject the equality hypothesis for
these variables for both prediction lengths and in both sub-samples.
When comparing across sub-samples (tests not reported in Table 3),
leverage of non-failing group firms is significantly higher than that
of non-failing stand-alone companies, both at t-1 and t-3. This is con-
sistent with the argument that debt-bearing capacity (and hence the
optimal leverage) of firms belonging to a group is higher. The data
also indicate that within groups, problems have been present for a
longer time before the bankruptcy filing. Specifically, at t-3, effi-
ciency (EFF) and leverage (LEV) are significantly worse for failing
group firms as compared to failing stand-alone companies (tests not
reported in Table 3). Another interesting result is that groups with a
failing subsidiary are in worse financial health as compared to groups
without failing subsidiaries; both at t-1 and t-3 the Altman Z” score at
UCO level (GZ) is significantly better for groups without failing
subs.
More information on the relative importance of predictors for stand-
alone versus group companies can be found in Table 4. The Table
reports the fit (ρ2) of univariate logistic regressions for all standard
bankruptcy prediction variables. In general, results are consistent with
the discussion of potential group effects in section I. The performance
ratios (PP and ROA) have more predictive power in the stand-alone
sub-sample, both at t-1 and t-3. The leverage ratio (LEV) does better
for stand-alone companies as well, but only at t-1. The largest differ-
ences in fit are observed for liquidity (LIQ; very poor performance for
group member companies) and for sales generating efficiency (EFF;





Summary statistics and univariate tests
t-1 t-3
Full Sample Stand-Alone Sample Group Sample Full Sample Stand-Alone Sample Group Sample
N FFN F N F N FFN FFN FFN FF
LIQ 1.028 0.637 1.079 0.629 1.001 0.669 0.997 0.735 1.010 0.716 0.974 0.741
(7.57)*** (5.78)*** (4.35)*** (4.97)*** (4.08)*** (2.75)***
PP 0.110 –0.110 0.168 –0.089 0.089 –0.142 0.119 –0.009 0.136 –0.001 0.103 –0.017
(11.00)*** (8.75)*** (6.69)*** (7.16)*** (5.62)*** (4.54)***
ROA 0.047 –0.051 0.053 –0.064 0.040 –0.044 0.042 0.014 0.047 0.018 0.019 0.005
(10.89)*** (8.28)*** 6.86)*** (4.87)*** (4.51)*** (2.40)**
LEV 0.659 0.846 0.644 0.853 0.697 0.841 0.696 0.789 0.678 0.776 0.734 0.828
(7.73)*** (5.91)*** (4.80)*** (3.90)*** (3.00)*** (2.87)***
EFF 0.102 –0.302 0.108 –0.214 0.101 –0.407 0.083 –0.224 0.080 –0.152 0.108 –0.287
(5.51)*** (3.09)*** (5.10)*** (4.35)*** (2.25)** (4.03)***
NCOM – – – – 0.009 0.000 – – – – 0.017 0.000
–– (2.85)*** – – (2.07)**
GZ – – – – 2.483 –0.810 – – – – 2.019 0.668
–– (6.53)*** – – (3.31)***
Test statistics in parentheses: Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) T-statistics for equality of medians; variables as defined in Table 2;
F = failed companies; NF = non-failed companies
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.indicates that business groups continue to support their subsidiaries as
long as they generate sufficient sales.
B. Basic prediction models and group adjustments
Of course, univariate tests alone do not suffice to determine the rela-
tive importance of predictors for group and stand-alone companies.
In this section we will therefore estimate multivariate logistic regres-
sion models for both sub-samples. Variable selection is done by a step-
wise optimisation technique (likelihood ratio optimising).
First an optimised model is estimated on the full sample to establish
a benchmark. Because of the high correlation between the past perfor-
mance (PP) and leverage (LEV) ratios, the selection technique is
restricted to include maximally one of these two variables. Results are
presented in Table 5. For both prediction lengths, the optimal model
specification contains the same three variables: PP, ROA (current per-
formance) and EFF (sales generating efficiency). All are highly sig-
nificant and have the expected signs. Similar to the literature, this very
simple model performs quite well and allows classifying 83.0 % (CP
quasi-jack-knife adjusted) of all companies correctly one year before
bankruptcy. ρ2 equals 0.548. Not surprisingly, model performance is
lower for the longer prediction horizon (ρ2 of 0.201 and CP of 69.0%).
Next, the same optimisation technique is used to construct models
for the stand-alone and group samples separately. Confirming the uni-
variate regression results, the optimal model specification is different
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TABLE 4
Performance of individual prediction ratios across sub-samples
t-1 t-3
Stand-Alone Group Stand-Alone Group
Sample Sample Sample Sample
LIQ 0.211 0.078 0.067 0.023
PP 0.476 0.317 0.194 0.110
ROA 0.425 0.309 0.124 0.075
LEV 0.230 0.173 0.060 0.063
EFF 0.048 0.190 0.033 0.128




Basic Bankruptcy Prediction Models and Group Adjustments
t-1 t-3
Full Stand-Alone  Group  Full  Sample Full Stand-Alone Group Full  Sample
Sample Sample Sample Group Adj.  Sample Sample Sample Group Adj.
PP –6.119*** –9.004*** –5.323*** –7.230*** –2.954*** –3.488*** –2.246** –3.690***
(31.442) (17.654) (13.438) (30.938) (18.405) (10.165) (5.354) (23.573)
ROA –14.901*** –19.965*** –10.749*** –16.244*** –4.326*** –5.448** –5.605** –5.729***































Intercept –0.047 1.384 –0.686 0.465 0.189 1.038 –0.210 0.469
ρ2 0.548 0.627 0.523 0.630 0.201 0.225 0.244 0.282
CPin sample 83.3 86.7 84.9 86.6 69.9 68.2 76.2 72.6
CPquasi-jack-knife 83.0 84.8 83.0 85.9 69.0 66.5 73.8 70.9
Stepwise Logistic Regressions (Likelihood Ratio Optimising); variables as defined in Table 2; Wald test statistics in parentheses;
CP = overall Classification Performance (in %)
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.depending on the class of company. PP and ROA are included in both
sub-samples, but for stand-alone companies LIQ is preferred over
EFF. One year before bankruptcy, the fit of the basic prediction model
is much better for stand-alone companies (ρ2 of 0.627) as compared
to business group companies (ρ2 of 0.523). By contrast, for the
medium prediction length performance is better in the group sample
due to the strong predictive power of the sales generating efficiency
proxy. By combining the predicted values made by the separate mod-
els, we obtain a ρ2 for the full sample but based on split sample esti-
mation. These ρ2s amount to 0.598 (t-1) and 0.242 (t-3) and show that
split sample estimation improves model fit by about 0.05 without
adding new information.
As an alternative for the split estimation approach, we take the full
sample and correct for group effects by adding the group adjustment
variables discussed in sections I and II to the pool of variables of the
optimisation algorithm. The fourth and eighth columns of Table 5
show the optimised model specification for t-1 and t-3 respectively.
For both prediction horizons NCOM and GZ are significant with a
negative coefficient. In other words, companies that are net receivers
of intra-group commitments and subsidiaries of healthy groups are,
ceteris paribus, less likely to file for bankruptcy. At t-1 the GROUP
dummy is significantly negative as well, albeit only at the 10% level.
The group-adjusted full sample models substantially outperform the
benchmark full sample models, both in terms of fit (an increase in ρ2
of 0.082 at t-1 and of 0.081 at t-3) and of classification performance.
The fit of the group-adjusted approach is also higher than that of the
split estimation. In sum, the results from Table 5 show that business
group business membership matters for the relative importance of indi-
vidual predictor variables and for overall predictive model perfor-
mance.
C. Incorporation of group adjustment variables into existing models
In this sub-section we turn to the question whether or not group cor-
rections add value to some well known and widely used prediction
models.
Undoubtedly worldwide the best known bankruptcy prediction indi-
cators are produced by Edward Altman’s Z and ZETA models. Due
to the low number of predictor ratios and the limited data require-
ments to compute those predictors, Z type models are popular with
636practitioners looking for a first quick assessment of failure probabil-
ity. For the same reasons, Altman Z scores are often used in the
finance and accounting literature as a measure of bankruptcy risk (e.g.
Allayanis et al. (2003); Sapienza (2004), among many others). Most
appropriate for our sample is the Z” version (Altman (1983)) designed
for non-quoted companies. It contains ratios for working capital, past
performance, current performance and leverage (see the appendix for
definitions). Note that the original Altman models are estimated with
MDA. As discussed in section II above, we use Altman (1983)’s vari-
ables in logistic regressions.
Results of these regressions are given in Table 6. Under the origi-
nal model specifications, model fit (ρ2 of 0.529 for t-1 and 0.184 for
t-3) is slightly lower than that of our non-group adjusted basic mod-
els from Table 5. Next, the Z” models are group adjusted based on a
stepwise optimisation selection process. The general results are very
similar to the ones obtained for the basic models. For the one year
prediction horizon, the GROUP dummy, net commitments to affili-
ated companies (NCOM) and the original Z” score of the ultimate
corporate owner (GZ) are significant predictors of bankruptcy. At t-3,
again only NCOM and GZ are included in the optimised model. The
performance improvement obtained by including the group adjustment
variables is even more outspoken for the Altman Z” models as com-
pared to our basic prediction models from Table 5: ρ2 increases by
0.111 (t-1) and 0.104 (t-3), while quasi-jack-knife corrected classifi-
cation performance rises with 3.2% one year before bankruptcy and
7.5% for the medium term prediction length.
As already mentioned, the ratios of the Altman models require only
a limited amount of accounting data. In Belgium, publicly available
financial statements are very detailed, even for small private compa-
nies. A number of Belgian bankruptcy prediction models have been
constructed to exploit this wealth of available data (for a survey, see
Ooghe et al. (1995)). Good examples are the Ooghe-Joos-De Vos mod-
els. Ooghe et al. (1991) estimate separate models one year and three
years before failure. The short term prediction model contains eight
factors (see appendix). These include measures of leverage, liquidity
and past and current performance. Furthermore, information from the
notes to the financial statements is used in computing a secured debt
ratio and a dummy for overdue tax and social security payments. The
first column of Table 7 shows the results of reestimating the original





Original Group Original Group
Specification Adjusted Specification Adjusted
AX1 0.393 – 0.399 –
(0.202) (0.315)
AX2 –6.030*** –7.325*** –2.745*** –3.198***
(29.760) (31.061) (13.073) (16.293)
AX3 –15.690*** –16.952*** –5.226*** –6.733***
(33.345) (28.197) (10.239) (13.839)
AX4 –0.586 –1.195*** –0.454** –0.659***
(2.599) (9.079) (3.385) (7.672)
GROUP – –0.731* – –
(3.193)
NCOM – –3.967*** – –2.767***
(17.656) (20.777)
GZ – –0.633*** – –0.170**
(16.277) (5.514)
Intercept 0.279 1.006 0.414 0.837
ρ2 0.529 0.640 0.184 0.288
CPin sample 83.0 86.9 65.4 73.2
CPquasi-jack-knife 82.4 85.6 64.7 72.2
Logistic Regressions using Altman (1983) variables as defined in the appendix;
Wald test statistics in parentheses; CP = overall Classification Performance (in %)
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level;
*** denotes significance at the 1% level.
on our sample. Note that the dummy for overdue payments (OJD1X4)
and the secured debt ratio (OJD1X8) are significant. Therefore, it is not
surprising this model outperforms the (non-group adjusted) basic and
Altman models from Tables 5 and 6. The second column at the left
hand side of Table 7 shows a group adjusted version of the OJD1
model. Net commitments to affiliated companies (NCOM) and the Z”
score of the ultimate corporate owner (GZ) are once again included
in the optimised specification, but in this case the GROUP dummy is
not. Given the fact that fit was already quite high, there is less scope
for improvement through group adjustment. Nevertheless, r2 still
increases with 0.034 to 0.664.639
TABLE 7
Ooghe et al. (1991) Models
t-1 t-3
Original Group Original Group
Specification Adjusted Specification Adjusted
OJD1X1 –1.594*** –2.485*** OJD3X1 –2.773*** –3.975***
(9.723) (29.570) (12.461) (25.716)
OJD1X2 –3.662*** –4.867*** OJD3X2 0.001 –
(13.656) (21.035) (1.174)
OJD1X3 –7.144** –9.211*** OJD3X3 1.285** 1.148**
(6.019) (8.908) (5.592) (4.382)
OJD1X4 2.461*** 2.552*** OJD3X4 –6.805*** –7.010***
(18.222) (15.317) (19.265) (19.336)
OJD1X5 –0.138 – OJD3X5 1.249* –
(0.018) (3.170)
OJD1X6 –2.977 – OJD3X6 0.640 –
(2.249) (0.699)
OJD1X7 4.288*** 4.238*** NCOM – –2.273***
(13.820) (14.860) (14.934)
OJD1X8 1.989** – GZ – –0.122*
(5.397) (2.703)





ρ2 0.630 0.664 ρ2 0.251 0.316
CPin sample 86.3 86.9 CPin sample 69.3 72.9
CPquasi-jack-knife 85.3 85.3 CPquasi-jack-knife 67.0 72.9
Logistic Regressions using Ooghe et al. (1991) variables as defined in the appen-
dix; Wald test statistics in parentheses; CP = overall Classification Performance
(in %)
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level;
*** denotes significance at the 1% level
The Ooghe-Joos-De Vos three-years-before-bankruptcy prediction
model (OJD3) consists of six factors (see appendix), two of which
– the proxies for current performance and overdue payments – were
already in OJD1. Other interesting variables are OJD3X2 (the lagbetween the end of the fiscal year and the publication date of the finan-
cial statements; not significant for our sample) and OJD3X5 (com-
mitments made by the sample company to affiliated companies).
The latter variable is comparable to our NCOM, but only shows half
the picture, i.e. it does not take into account the commitments made
by affiliated companies to the sample company. Therefore, it is not
surprising that NCOM and not OJD3X5 is included in the optimised
model specification. As was the case for the other medium term mod-
els, the additional group adjustments have a very positive impact on
performance, both in terms of fit and of classification success.
Table 8 summarizes the fit of the different model specifications we
evaluated. In addition to the ρ2 of the standard and group adjusted
models from Tables 5, 6 and 7, the fit of a split estimation approach
is reported as well. Recall that the split estimation approach entails the
estimation of two separate models (one for stand-alone companies and
another for business group members) using an optimised mix of stan-
dard predictor variables (i.e. without group adjustment variables).
It turns out that split estimation increases fit by 0.02 to 0.05 for all
models and in both prediction lengths. Given the fact that extra infor-
mation is used in the group adjusted models, it is not surprising their
fit further improves (improvements between 0.034 and 0.111 com-






ρ2 – Standard 0.548 0.201
ρ2 – Split Estimation 0.598 0.242
ρ2 – Group Adjusted 0.630 0.282
Altman Z”
ρ2 – Standard 0.529 0.184
ρ2 – Split Estimation 0.552 0.203
ρ2 – Group Adjusted 0.640 0.288
Ooghe-Joos-De Vos (1991)
ρ2 – Standard 0.630 0.251
ρ2 – Split Estimation 0.650 0.306
ρ2 – Group Adjusted 0.664 0.316IV. CONCLUSIONS
The bankruptcy prediction literature tends to ignore ownership struc-
ture and implicitly assumes companies are stand-alone entities. On
the European Continent this assumption does not hold because many
companies are linked through business groups. As these groups likely
actively use internal capital markets, the predictive power of classic
bankruptcy predictors (such as liquidity, performance, leverage or effi-
ciency) may be different for group companies as compared to stand-
alone firms. We show that the univariate performance of liquidity, past
performance and current performance ratios is better for stand-alone
companies and that sales generating efficiency predicts failure better
for group members. Optimised multivariate models confirm these
results: sales generating efficiency is only included in a sub-sample
consisting of group member companies, while liquidity is only sig-
nificant for stand-alone firms. By estimating separate models for the
sub-samples of companies, global fit in terms of r2 improves by up
to 0.05. An even larger improvement, with relative increases of r2 of
40% or more, is achieved by controlling directly for group effects.
A dummy for group membership is only useful in some cases. More
refined control variables – net commitments made by affiliated com-
panies and the Altman Z” score of the group or the ultimate corporate
owner – are significant predictors across all model specifications, both
for short-term and medium-term prediction horizons. These group cor-
rections also improve the predictive performance of existing models
such as Altman (1983) and Ooghe et al. (1991).
In general, results are consistent with the notion that business groups
support poorly performing subsidiaries unless the financial situation
of the group prevents them from engaging in this activity (cf. Lamont
(1997)). A more detailed analysis of the group’s or the ultimate cor-
porate owner’s characteristics may shed more light on intra-group
behaviour towards distressed subsidiaries.
NOTES
1. Under Belgian Accounting Law, “large” companies are required to file complete
(unconsolidated) accounts if they meet at least two of the following criteria: total assets
exceeding 3.125 million euros, operating revenue exceeding 6.25 million euros, or more
than 50 full time equivalent employees. Companies with on average more than 100
full time equivalent employees are always classified as “large”, regardless of assets
and revenue. All other (“small”) companies are allowed to file abbreviated accounts.
6412. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products, a former NASDAQ quoted company for which
accounts allegedly do not reflect economic reality; Sabena, a State controlled airline
company; Durobor, a State controlled glass manufacturer.
3. For instance, lowering the control threshold from 50% to 20% increases the number
of sample companies identified as business group members from 141 to 157 in the one
year before failure sample, and from 130 to 143 in the three year before failure sam-
ple. Robustness checks show that results and findings remain unaltered.
4. Following Platt and Platt (1991), computation of industry statistics is based on the 4-
digit industry classification code NACE-BEL (the Belgian version of the European
standard industry classification system NACE). If there are less than 25 observations
in an industry the 3 or 2-digit NACE-BEL is used instead.
5. Under Belgian Accounting Law, all companies which are controlled by or are con-
trolling a corporation are considered to be “affiliated”. Control is defined as holding
more than 50% of the shares or the votes, or having common controlling sharehold-
ers who can appoint the majority of the board or can make strategic decisions. This
control can also be the result of company bylaws, contracts or the existence of a con-
sortium. Information on affiliated companies is reported in the comments to the finan-
cial statements.
6. Jack-knife correction is a leaving-one-out validation procedure in which an observa-
tion is removed from the sample, the model parameters are reestimated and the obser-
vation is classified based on the new model parameters. This means the entire proce-
dure consists of estimating as many models as there are observations. To limit
computation time, a number of software packages (including SAS) automatically pro-
vide a one-step approximation to jack-knife adjusted parameter estimates; hence the
term quasi-jack-knife.
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Definition of variables in Altman (1983) and Ooghe et al. (1991) models
Variable Definition Proxy for E(Failure Prob.)
Altman Z”
AX1 (working capital)⁄ (total assets) Working Capital –
AX2 (reserves + retained earnings)⁄ (total assets) Past Performance –
AX3 (operating profits (losses))⁄ (total assets) Current Performance –
AX4 equity/(total debt) Leverage –
Ooghe-Joos-De Vos
OJD1X1 dummy variable;  Direction of Financial 
1 if (net return on total assets before taxes – average interest rate of debt) > 0 Leverage –
OJD1X2 Past Performance –
OJD1X3 (cash + ST investments)/(total assets) Liquidity –
OJD1X4 dummy variable; 1 if (overdue taxes & social security charges) > 0 Overdue Payments +
OJD1X5 Working Capital –
   
inventories accounts receivable accounts payable
taxes wage socials security debts advances onW I P























OJD1X6 net return on operating assets before taxes Current Performance –
OJD1X7 (ST financial debt)⁄ (ST debt) ST Financial Debt +
OJD1X8 (guaranteed debt)⁄ (total debt) Guaranteed Debt +
OJD3X1 = OJD1X2 Past Performance –
OJD3X2 number of days between end of fiscal year and filing of accounts Publication Lag +
OJD3X3 = OJD1X4 Overdue Payments +
OJD3X4 (EBITDA – capital investments)⁄ (total assets) Autofinancing Ability –
OJD3X5 Group Relationships +
OJD3X6 Leverage +
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